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Dead in the water
Retired now since 1991, I realize that were I in practice now, I would have to familiarize myself with the Human Tissues Act. Not only is the habit of consented autopsy under threat, but also the custom of continuity of care. I always believed that my duty to the patient and his or her family started from the original consultation and continued until discharge or death.
I always took consent for postmortem examination in person, as part of my role and as a mark of respect for the family. I never (or hardly ever) delegated this responsibility and as a result, refusal was very exceptional. Furthermore, I always offered to see the family after the postmortem to explain or allay any further doubts they may have had.
The postmortem was usually conducted by myself and the pathologist together. This was helpful, particularly if complicated surgery had been involved, and was also of great educational benefit to both of us and the junior staff.
It was helpful that I and the pathologist worked on the same hospital site.
We had no need of a permanent cohort of bereavement teams and officers or a 'Core Consent Coordinator'. My ward sister fulfilled all these roles.
Martin Spiro
Retired Consultant Surgeon Email: spirotoothill.t21@btinternet.com
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None declared DOI: 10.1258 DOI: 10. /jrsm.2012 Confusion over DNAR orders Foster and Hope 1 describe '… considerable confusion over the status of "do not attempt resuscitation" (DNAR) orders'. Their analysis of the legal status of these orders is clear but does not explain why there is confusion; they may also underestimate some practical difficulties.
The Mental Capacity Act (MCA) provides measured and nuanced rules, but those who draft statutes do not always have to consider practical implementation. They might assume that all clinical staff can be meticulously trained in every implication and can comply with complex rules in the, often chaotic, circumstances of arrests.
Elective assessment of capacity must be measured and nuanced, but the person witnessing a cardiac arrest has to act more pragmatically. The authors note that this is often a nurse, but he or she might not conduct assessments of capacity and might not receive such detailed training as medical staff in the implications of the MCA and DNAR orders. Patients often move between wards, but accurate information and knowledge often do not follow. The authors 'hope' that DNAR reviews have occurred and 'should' be in handovers may be overoptimistic.
They state that the first decision at an arrest must be whether or not to call the resuscitation team; actually, it is whether to start basic life support. It is this decision that could result in the nurse risking a charge of battery, as the authors warn, or of accusation of not attempting resuscitation later thought to have been indicated.
They further state that the first decision must legally be made at the time of the arrest, either on the basis of an order's validity and applicability or of the patient's best interests, as assessed at that time. The authors might try to estimate a minimum time needed for such an assessment, particularly with inadequate notes. I suspect that it exceeds the short window of opportunity to secure even the small chance of successful resuscitation.
None of this negates the authors' helpful analysis, or the need for correct implementation, but some clinical circumstances can confound the best legal and ethical intentions. I wonder how many nurses will read the essay.
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